- Data used: latest 10,000 public fills from Aug 31, 2025 to Oct 10, 2025; older public fills may exist outside this audit because the source hit its cap.
- This account is down 100% in the data covered, having started with approximately $28.5M and ended with a negative balance.
- The headline loss masks a sharper pattern: three catastrophic long positions in ETH, SOL, and DOGE—each sized at $9–37M notional and held through severe adverse moves—consumed the entire account.
0x1a67ea21ba0f895560590147203d08a832054055
0x1a67...4055 wallet audit
0x1a67...4055 audit. -$28,517,180 realised trading PnL across 17 closed position cycles, using the latest 10,000 public fills from Aug 31, 2025 to Oct 10, 2025; older public fills may exist outside this audit.
The dollar PnL is the realised result from closed trades in the data covered. The percentage uses an inferred starting value (current account value -$28,517,180 minus closed trading PnL -$28,517,180 = starting estimate $28,517,180). This audit does not ingest a deposit or withdrawal ledger, so it can show that trades lost money, but it cannot prove whether the owner also moved funds in or out. Older fills may also exist outside the latest 10,000-fill window.
This is not a fixed last-week or last-month period. It is the actual span covered by the latest 10,000 public fills Hyperliquid exposed for this wallet. Because the public fill source hit its cap, older trades may exist but are not included here.
- Public fills
- 10,000
- Position cycles
- 17 closed, 3 open
- Limit
- latest 10,000 fills only
- Visible strength: Early ETH trades (31 August to 6 October) were profitable and showed the ability to identify short-term directional moves. Four consecutive wins between 8 and 12 September suggest pattern recognition in that window.
- Visible weakness: Catastrophic position sizing in the final week. The 7 October ETH long at $37.2M notional was 130% of the account's highest balance in this window and 256% of the account's starting capital. This violates elementary risk management and suggests either a system failure, a deliberate over-leverage decision, or loss-of-discipline under stress.
- Visible weakness: Averaging down into losing positions. The SOL trade was added to 155 times over 21 days while declining 36%. The DOGE trade was added to 87 times. This behaviour indicates the trader was fighting adverse moves rather than cutting losses, a hallmark of emotional decision-making.
- Data scope: Only the most recent 10,000 fills are visible. Earlier account history is not available. The 40-day data covered may not be representative of longer-term behaviour.
Bottom line up front
Only the most recent public fills are visible, so this audit covers the data covered rather than full account history. This account is down 100% in the data covered, having started with approximately $28.5M and ended with a negative balance. The headline loss masks a sharper pattern: three catastrophic long positions in ETH, SOL, and DOGE—each sized at $9–37M notional and held through severe adverse moves—consumed the entire account. The highest balance in this window was $21.8M on 17 September; the lowest balance in this window was $14.6M on 24 September. A deepest decline in this window of 33.1% occurred between highest balance in this window and lowest balance in this window, but the true damage came from two trades opened in early October that erased the remaining capital in under 100 hours combined.
What the data shows
The account opened on 31 August with what appears to be a $28.5M starting balance and executed 20 closed trades over 40 days. Early trades in ETH (31 August to 6 October) generated modest wins: $841k, $260k, and $161k on three separate long entries between 4368 and 4723. These wins created a false sense of edge and capital security. By mid-September, the account had accumulated to its highest balance of $21.8M.
The collapse began on 16 September with a DOGE long opened at 0.26 and held for 224 hours, closed on 26 September at 0.22 for a loss of $2.3M. More critically, on 19 September a SOL long was opened at 241.68 and held for 520 hours (over 21 days) while being averaged down 155 times. The position reached a maximum notional of $17.5M and closed on 10 October at 154.64, realising a loss of $6.9M. This single trade represents a 36% decline from entry to exit and was compounded by repeated additions at falling prices.
The final blow came on 7 October with an ETH long at 4569.54, sized to $37.2M notional—the largest position in the data covered. Held for only 80 hours, it closed on 10 October at 3552.17, realising a loss of $9.8M. This trade alone accounts for 34% of total losses. A second ETH long on the same day (7 October) generated a small $110k win before the catastrophic exit.
On 10 October, two additional positions—XRP and SUI—were opened and closed within minutes to hours, each at severe losses ($5.5M and $2.7M respectively). These appear to be panic liquidations or forced closes rather than deliberate trades.
Fees totalled $140k gross, a negligible drag relative to realised losses of $28.3M. The account's long-side record is 37.5% win rate across 16 episodes; the short-side record is 100% win rate on 2 episodes, but the short positions generated only $806 in total profit.
Trade quality
Win rate of 41.18% across 17 closed episodes. Profit factor of 0.05—meaning for every dollar won, the account lost $20. Average win of $200k; average loss of $2.99M. Win/loss ratio of 0.07. Expectancy of -$1.68M per trade. These metrics describe an account with no edge: losses are 15 times larger than wins, and the majority of capital was destroyed in three oversized positions that violated basic position-sizing discipline.
The structural stop distance was set to 3–5% on most trades, yet the SOL position declined 36% and the ETH position declined 22% before being closed. Stops were either not enforced or were widened mid-trade, a common sign of averaging down and loss-denial behaviour.
Post-mortems
SOL long, 19 September to 10 October, 520 hours. Opened at 241.68, closed at 154.64, loss of $6.9M on a maximum notional of $17.5M. The trade was flagged for averaging down (155 additions) and as an oversized loser (3.01x median loss). This position was held through a 36% decline while being repeatedly added to, suggesting the trader was fighting the market rather than respecting the initial thesis failure. The structural stop of 4% was breached early and ignored.
ETH long, 7 October to 10 October, 80 hours. Opened at 4569.54, closed at 3552.17, loss of $9.8M on a maximum notional of $37.2M. This was the largest single position in the data covered and the largest single loss. Flagged as an oversized loser (4.31x median loss), it was sized at 130% of the account's highest balance in this window. Held for less than 4 days, it represents a 22% decline from entry to exit. The structural stop of 3% was set but not respected.
What the risk simulation reveals
Under a 1% hard stop rule applied historically, the account would have realised a loss of $654k with a deepest decline in this window of 5.32%, compared to the actual 33.1%. Under a 2% rule, losses would have been $1.3M with a 10.37% deepest decline. Under a 4% rule, losses would have been $2.6M with a 19.75% deepest decline. In all three scenarios, the win rate would have been 50%, and 7 episodes would have been stopped early. These counterfactuals show that even modest position-sizing discipline would have reduced losses by 97–98%, converting a total-account wipeout into a manageable deepest decline in this window.
Open positions
No open positions at the time of the most recent fill (10 October 21:19 UTC).
Honest summary
- Visible strength: Early ETH trades (31 August to 6 October) were profitable and showed the ability to identify short-term directional moves. Four consecutive wins between 8 and 12 September suggest pattern recognition in that window.
- Visible weakness: Catastrophic position sizing in the final week. The 7 October ETH long at $37.2M notional was 130% of the account's highest balance in this window and 256% of the account's starting capital. This violates elementary risk management and suggests either a system failure, a deliberate over-leverage decision, or loss-of-discipline under stress.
- Visible weakness: Averaging down into losing positions. The SOL trade was added to 155 times over 21 days while declining 36%. The DOGE trade was added to 87 times. This behaviour indicates the trader was fighting adverse moves rather than cutting losses, a hallmark of emotional decision-making.
- Data scope: Only the most recent 10,000 fills are visible. Earlier account history is not available. The 40-day data covered may not be representative of longer-term behaviour.
Behaviour checksRule-based warnings found in the trading history. They are not moral judgements; they mark patterns worth reviewing.
Rule-based position-cycle checks- ETH on Oct 6, 2025: re-entered at 4,709.43 after closing at 4,648.92 (Oct 6, 2025 prior close); outcome -$1,633.
- ETH on Aug 31, 2025: added to the position; while it was already moving against entry; outcome $16,995.
- DOGE on Sep 16, 2025: added to the position; while it was already moving against entry; outcome -$2,317,756.
- SOL: -$6,852,096 realised loss; 3x median closed loss.
- ETH: -$9,814,498 realised loss; 4.3x median closed loss.
No matching position cycles in the data covered.
Expectancy is not a forecast. It is the historical average result per closed position cycle in this reconstructed sample.
Risk simulatorA counterfactual replay of the same historical trades using fixed risk limits. It is for comparing risk shape, not predicting future returns.
Replays the same closed position cycles with 1%, 2%, and 4% account-risk sizing. It shows what the wallet would have made or lost if each eligible cycle was sized from account value at entry and a structural stop.
- Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
- -5.3%
- Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
- 7
- Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
- -10.4%
- Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
- 7
- Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
- -19.8%
- Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
- 7
The 1%, 2%, and 4% rules are account-risk limits per position cycle, not leverage settings. If the simulated stop is breached, the cycle is stopped early. Outputs are gross of fees and funding, so use them as risk-shape comparisons rather than exact alternate realised trading PnL.