0x4efdb6c6813c648ed775ce7f3ff6e08bca83fc7a
0x4efd...fc7a audit. -$7,457,143 realised trading PnL across 28 closed position cycles, using the latest 10,000 public fills from Jun 19, 2025 to Feb 5, 2026; older public fills may exist outside this audit.
The dollar PnL is the realised result from closed trades in the data covered. The percentage uses an inferred starting value (current account value $342,017 minus closed trading PnL -$7,457,143 = starting estimate $7,799,160). This audit does not ingest a deposit or withdrawal ledger, so it can show that trades lost money, but it cannot prove whether the owner also moved funds in or out. Older fills may also exist outside the latest 10,000-fill window.
This is not a fixed last-week or last-month period. It is the actual span covered by the latest 10,000 public fills Hyperliquid exposed for this wallet. Because the public fill source hit its cap, older trades may exist but are not included here.
Only the most recent public fills are visible, so this audit covers the data covered rather than full account history. This account is -95.61% in the data covered, having started with approximately $7.8M and fallen to $342K. The highest balance in this window was $6.19M on 1 October; the lowest was $247K on 25 June. The deepest decline in this window reached -94.26%. The headline pattern is uncontrolled position sizing on outsized directional bets, particularly three catastrophic losses in BTC shorts and one in SUI longs that dwarf all wins combined. Fees are immaterial relative to the core problem: the account took positions 6–222x larger than median losses and held them through adverse moves without structural stops.
The account opened on 19 June 2025 and has completed 28 closed trades across BTC, SUI, HYPE, and SOL in the data covered. BTC dominates the record: 24 episodes, -$6.18M realised PnL, with a 70.83% win rate on individual trades that masks a catastrophic short-side collapse. The long side of BTC generated $306K; the short side lost $6.49M. SUI produced two trades, both losses totalling -$1.28M. HYPE and SOL each contributed single profitable trades worth $1.67K and $1.23K respectively.
The account's trajectory reveals a boom-and-bust cycle. Early July saw the account build toward $6.19M by mid-October, driven by a $420K short win on BTC closed 10 August. However, the account then entered a sequence of oversized positions that obliterated capital. The largest loss—a BTC short opened 14 August and closed 31 January—lost $6.67M on a notional position of $39.86M, 222x the median loss size. A SUI long opened 28 July and closed 5 February lost $1.32M on $2.31M notional, 43.8x median. A third BTC short opened 10 July and closed 14 July lost $190K on $4.72M notional, 6.3x median.
Behavioural flags show three revenge trades, all in BTC, all opened within hours of prior losses. On 10 August, after the SUI loss, a $9.51M BTC long was opened. On 11 August, after a $550 BTC loss, a $13.41M short was opened and closed 1.12 hours later for -$42.86K. Minutes later, a $7.17M BTC short followed the same pattern. These are not tactical adjustments; they are panic-driven re-entries at maximum leverage.
Fees paid total $83.72K on $265.7M gross volume, a 0.032% blended rate. Fee drag is immaterial to the outcome. The account's realised PnL after fees is -$8.35M. The gap between realised and headline PnL reflects open positions at the window close.
Win rate is 71.43%, but this is a false signal. Profit factor is 0.1—for every dollar won, ten dollars were lost. Expectancy is -$266.33K per trade. Win/loss ratio is 0.04: the average win was $39.99K; the average loss was -$1.03M. The largest loss was 167x the average win.
The account won 20 of 28 closed trades but lost 89% of its capital because losses were systematically 25x larger than wins. This is not a win-rate problem; it is a position-sizing problem. A 71% win rate with a 0.1 profit factor is a signature of uncapped downside exposure on directional bets.
BTC short, 14 August – 31 January, -$6.67M loss.
Opened 14 August, closed 31 January at $100,266.37. Maximum notional reached $39.86M. This position was held for 4,086 hours (170 days) through a sustained rally in BTC. The loss is 222x the median loss in the account. No structural stop was in place. This is the single largest capital destruction event in the data covered. The position was sized to the account's maximum leverage capacity and held through a multi-month adverse move without exit discipline.
SUI long, 28 July – 5 February, -$1.32M loss.
Opened 28 July, closed 5 February at $1.36. Maximum notional reached $2.31M. Held for 4,606 hours (192 days). This loss is 43.8x the median loss. The account had a 4% structural stop in place but did not use it. The position was held through a sustained decline in SUI from entry to exit, accumulating losses passively.
Both trades share a pattern: large notional size, no active stop discipline, and passive hold through adverse moves. Neither trade was closed on a signal; both were closed after the account had deteriorated significantly, suggesting forced liquidation or margin pressure rather than planned exit.
Under a 1% stop-loss rule applied historically, the account would have realised $24.36K profit with a maximum decline of -0.7%, stopping out of 1 trade early. Under 2%, the simulated result is $48.73K with -1.31% decline. Under 4%, $97.45K with -2.3% decline. These are gross-of-fees figures. The simulation shows that mechanical stops would have converted this account from -95.61% to small positive territory. The single largest trade (the BTC short) would have been stopped at 4% loss, preventing the $6.67M realisation.
No open positions at window close.
No matching position cycles in the data covered.
No matching position cycles in the data covered.
Expectancy is not a forecast. It is the historical average result per closed position cycle in this reconstructed sample.
Replays the same closed position cycles with 1%, 2%, and 4% account-risk sizing. It shows what the wallet would have made or lost if each eligible cycle was sized from account value at entry and a structural stop.
The 1%, 2%, and 4% rules are account-risk limits per position cycle, not leverage settings. If the simulated stop is breached, the cycle is stopped early. Outputs are gross of fees and funding, so use them as risk-shape comparisons rather than exact alternate realised trading PnL.