0x4efdb6c6813c648ed775ce7f3ff6e08bca83fc7a
0x4efd...fc7a audit. -$7,457,143 realised trading PnL across 28 closed position cycles, using the latest 10,000 public fills from Jun 19, 2025 to Feb 5, 2026; older public fills may exist outside this audit.
The dollar PnL is the realised result from closed trades in the data covered. The percentage uses an inferred starting value (current account value $293,149 minus closed trading PnL -$7,457,143 = starting estimate $7,750,292). This audit does not ingest a deposit or withdrawal ledger, so it can show that trades lost money, but it cannot prove whether the owner also moved funds in or out. Older fills may also exist outside the latest 10,000-fill window.
This is not a fixed last-week or last-month period. It is the actual span covered by the latest 10,000 public fills Hyperliquid exposed for this wallet. Because the public fill source hit its cap, older trades may exist but are not included here.
Only the most recent public fills are visible, so this audit covers the data covered rather than full account history. This account is -96.22% in the data covered, having collapsed from a highest balance in this window of $6.19M to a current balance of $293k. The deepest decline in this window reached -94.26%. The wreckage stems from two catastrophic losses: a $6.67M short BTC position opened 14 August 2025 and a $1.31M long SUI position opened 28 July 2025. Both were oversized relative to median losses by factors of 222x and 44x respectively. The account exhibits severe behavioural dysfunction: revenge trading after losses, FOMO re-entries into BTC immediately after closing positions, and structural stops set at 3–4% that proved useless against position sizes that could move 30–40% notional in a single trade.
The account started the data covered with approximately $7.75M and traded actively across 28 closed episodes plus 5 open positions (now closed). The arc is not a gradual decay but a violent collapse punctuated by brief recoveries. From 19 June through early August, the account oscillated between small wins and medium losses, building to a highest balance in this window balance of $6.19M on 1 October. Then, between 14 August and 5 February, two positions consumed $7.99M in realised losses.
BTC dominates the activity: 24 episodes, -$6.18M realised PnL. The long side generated $306k profit across BTC longs, but the short side destroyed $6.49M. SUI contributed -$1.28M across just 2 episodes, both long. HYPE and SOL were minor: +$1.67k and +$1.23k respectively. The account's win rate of 71.43% across all closed episodes masks the true damage: average win was $39,990; average loss was -$1,032,118. The profit factor of 0.1 means for every dollar won, ten dollars were lost.
Fees paid totalled $83,720 gross, a rounding error against the scale of losses. The real cost was not execution but position sizing and hold duration. The two post-mortem trades were held for 4,086 hours (BTC short) and 4,606 hours (SUI long)—nearly six months each—allowing adverse moves to compound into extinction-level drawdowns.
Long versus short reveals the structural problem: longs won 88.24% of the time but lost $970,990 overall; shorts won only 45.45% of the time and lost $6.49M. The account had no edge on the short side and should never have been there.
Win rate of 71.43% is a mirage. Profit factor of 0.1 is catastrophic. Expectancy of -$266,327 per trade means the account was mathematically doomed from the start. Win-loss ratio of 0.04 translates to: for every winning trade, 25 losing trades were needed to offset it. The max win streak of 7 trades and max loss streak of 4 trades show the account could string together wins but could not survive the inevitable reversals.
The closed-episode sample of 28 trades is sufficient to establish that this account had no edge. The long side's 88% win rate on a small sample size ($306k profit) could be noise; the short side's 45% win rate on a larger sample ($6.49M loss) is signal. The account was short-biased and wrong.
BTC short, 14 August 2025 – 31 January 2026, -$6,672,282
Opened at $113,246, exited at $81,473 after 4,086 hours. Maximum notional reached $39.86M. Flagged as both a FOMO re-entry and oversized loser (222x median loss multiple). This trade was a catastrophe in slow motion. The entry price of $113,246 was near a local high; BTC subsequently rallied to $122k+ before collapsing. The structural stop at 3% ($116,544) was never hit, despite the position size being large enough that a 3% move represented $1.2M in notional exposure. The account held through a $30M+ swing in unrealised PnL, eventually taking the loss at $81,473 after BTC had fallen 28% from entry. This was not a risk-managed trade; it was a gamble sized for ruin.
SUI long, 28 July 2025 – 5 February 2026, -$1,315,416
Opened at $2.19, exited at $1.20 after 4,606 hours. Maximum notional reached $2.31M. Flagged as an oversized loser (44x median loss multiple). Entry was near a local highest balance in this window; SUI subsequently fell 45% to exit. The 4% structural stop ($2.10) was breached immediately and never enforced. The account held a coin that was in a clear downtrend, sized at 30% of account equity at entry, and waited six months for it to crater. This trade exemplifies the account's inability to cut losses early or size positions rationally.
Under a 1% stop-loss rule applied historically, the account would have realised +$3,211 with a maximum decline of -0.32%. Under 2%, it would have realised +$6,423 with -0.64% decline. Under 4%, it would have realised +$12,845 with -1.28% decline. Five episodes would have been stopped early under all three rules. The simulator demonstrates that mechanical risk discipline would have transformed this account from a -$7.46M catastrophe into a small profitable account. The account had the tools (structural stops) but did not use them. The stops were set but ignored.
No open positions remain. The account is flat.
No matching position cycles in the data covered.
Expectancy is not a forecast. It is the historical average result per closed position cycle in this reconstructed sample.
Replays the same closed position cycles with 1%, 2%, and 4% account-risk sizing. It shows what the wallet would have made or lost if each eligible cycle was sized from account value at entry and a structural stop.
The 1%, 2%, and 4% rules are account-risk limits per position cycle, not leverage settings. If the simulated stop is breached, the cycle is stopped early. Outputs are gross of fees and funding, so use them as risk-shape comparisons rather than exact alternate realised trading PnL.