RRektrospect

0x61ceef212ff4a86933c69fb6aca2fe35d8f2a62b

0x61ce...a62b wallet audit

0x61ce...a62b audit. -$836,608 realised trading PnL across 18 closed position cycles, using the latest 10,000 public fills from May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026; older public fills may exist outside this audit.

loss-dominatedA quick bucket assigned from realised trading PnL, closed position-cycle count, and whether the public fill source was capped. Data covered: May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026. Classification basis: closed net pnl after fees available window.latest 10,000 fillsHyperliquid's public fills source is capped for very active wallets. This audit used the latest 10,000 public fills it could retrieve, covering May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026. Older trades may exist outside this page, so lifetime claims are avoided.
ModeProfessional keeps the tone factual. Roast uses the same numbers but writes the commentary more sharply.
ProfessionalRoast
Max drawdownLargest fall from a previous balance high to a later low inside the data covered: May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026.-75.0%18 closed position cycles
Win rateShare of closed position cycles that ended positive. Profit factor compares total winning realised PnL with total losing realised PnL.+38.9%0.12 profit factor
Total volumeGross notional traded across 10,000 reconstructed public fills. A position cycle can contain many individual fills.$183,114,20023 position cycles
Trading PnL vs transfersRealised trading PnL comes from Hyperliquid closed-fill profit and loss. Deposits and withdrawals can change account value, but they are not counted as trading PnL here.

The dollar PnL is the realised result from closed trades in the data covered. The percentage uses an inferred starting value (current account value $2,419,679 minus closed trading PnL -$836,608 = starting estimate $3,256,287). This audit does not ingest a deposit or withdrawal ledger, so it can show that trades lost money, but it cannot prove whether the owner also moved funds in or out. Older fills may also exist outside the latest 10,000-fill window.

Data coveredHyperliquid's public fills source is capped for very active wallets. This audit used the latest 10,000 public fills it could retrieve, covering May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026. Older trades may exist outside this page, so lifetime claims are avoided.May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026

This is not a fixed last-week or last-month period. It is the actual span covered by the latest 10,000 public fills Hyperliquid exposed for this wallet. Because the public fill source hit its cap, older trades may exist but are not included here.

Public fills
10,000
Position cycles
18 closed, 5 open
Limit
latest 10,000 fills only
Equity curveA historical line showing how the wallet balance moved across the data covered: May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026. It is not a prediction.$2,419,679
latest fills onlyHyperliquid's public fills source is capped for very active wallets. This audit used the latest 10,000 public fills it could retrieve, covering May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026. Older trades may exist outside this page, so lifetime claims are avoided.
Equity curve by date and account valueX-axis shows date. Y-axis shows account value in US dollars. The line starts at May 3 with $3.2M and ends at May 7 with $2.4M.Account value (USD)Date$3.3M$2.9M$2.4MMay 3May 4May 7
Audit summaryA short extract from the full trader analysis below. It is built from the stored numbers and evidence pack.What matters immediately
  • Data used: latest 10,000 public fills from May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026; older public fills may exist outside this audit because the source hit its cap.
  • The account is down 25.7% ($836.6k) in the data covered, with a deepest decline in this window of 74.97%.
  • The core problem is not edge—short-side ETH and BTC trades generated small wins—but position sizing and loss control.
Analysis readoutA plain-language interpretation layer from the trader analysis. Use the cards and tables below for the raw evidence.Strengths & weaknesses
  • Visible strength: Short-side scalps on liquid majors (ETH, BTC) worked when held under 2.5 hours; the account captured $102.4k across five short episodes on these two coins. The edge, if any, is in sub-hour reversals on high-volume instruments.
  • Visible weakness: Position sizing is disconnected from risk. SNDK, BRENTOIL, and MSTR positions were 3.57–18.8× the median loss size. No stops are used. Revenge trading and averaging down on losers are documented behavioural patterns, not one-off mistakes.
  • Visible weakness: The account has no loss-control discipline. The deepest decline in this window of 74.97% occurred over 48 hours. The highest balance in this window was $14.14m; the lowest was $3.54m. This is not volatility; it is uncontrolled deepest decline in this window from two trades.
  • Data scope: Only the most recent 10,000 fills are visible. The account is
Trader analysisThis is the full written analysis for this wallet and mode. The metrics, flags, simulator, and tables below are the supporting evidence.Full trader analysis

Bottom line up front

Only the most recent public fills are visible, so this audit covers the data covered rather than full account history. The account is down 25.7% ($836.6k) in the data covered, with a deepest decline in this window of 74.97%. The core problem is not edge—short-side ETH and BTC trades generated small wins—but position sizing and loss control. Three trades (SNDK short, BRENTOIL long, MSTR short) account for $818k of the loss; all three were oversized relative to median loss size and executed with no stops. Revenge trading and averaging down on losers amplified the damage.

What the data shows

The account opened with $3.26m and reached a highest balance in this window of $14.14m on 4 May, then collapsed to $3.54m by 5 May. The arc is not a slow bleed but a violent spike and crash, driven by two catastrophic single-day trades: SNDK short on 4 May closed in 0.04 hours for -$373.4k (18.8× median loss), and BRENTOIL long opened on 4 May and closed on 7 May for -$354.2k (17.83× median loss). The BRENTOIL position was also flagged as a revenge trade following a $5.4k loss on the same instrument earlier that day.

Across 18 closed episodes, the account realised -$801.6k in PnL and paid $33.6k in fees, for a net loss of -$835.2k. The win rate is 38.89%, but wins average $16.1k while losses average -$86.3k, yielding a profit factor of 0.12 and expectancy of -$46.5k per trade. Long trades lost $358.9k (33.33% win rate); short trades lost $477.8k (40% win rate). Neither direction showed edge.

By instrument, only ETH (6 episodes, +$18.8k) and INTC (1 episode, +$5k) and TSLA (1 episode, +$3.5k) were profitable. SNDK, BRENTOIL, MSTR, and BTC combined for -$863.1k across 10 episodes. The largest wins were two short ETH trades on 3–4 May (+$59.8k and +$7.7k) and a short BTC trade on 3 May (+$34.7k), all under 2.5 hours. These micro-wins were dwarfed by single catastrophic losses.

Trade quality

Win rate of 38.89% with a profit factor of 0.12 means the account won on 7 of 18 closed trades but lost 12× more per loss than it gained per win. The win/loss ratio of 0.19 is severe. Expectancy of -$46.5k per trade is the plainest statement: on average, each closed position lost $46.5k before fees. Gross fees of $33.6k were paid on $183.1m in gross volume (41.15% maker), a reasonable fee rate, but fees are immaterial next to the realised PnL damage.

Post-mortems

SNDK short, 4 May, closed 4 May at $1,250.69, -$373.4k. Opened and closed on the same day in 0.04 hours with a max position notional of $3.59m. Flagged as an oversized loser (18.8× median loss). No entry price or stop data available. This was a scalp that went catastrophically wrong in minutes. The position size relative to account equity at that moment was reckless; the speed of execution suggests panic or FOMO entry.

BRENTOIL long, 4 May 05:52 UTC, closed 7 May at $97.37, -$354.2k. Max position notional $11.32m, held 80.39 hours. Flagged as both an oversized loser (17.83× median loss) and a revenge trade following a -$5.4k loss on BRENTOIL earlier on 4 May at 05:44 UTC. The account averaged down 8 times on this position, adding at $107.49, $107.47, and $107.48, each time doubling down into a falling market. No structural stop was in place. This is textbook revenge trading and loss-chasing: after bleeding $5.4k, the account re-entered the same instrument at 3.57× the median loss size and held it through a 3-day decline.

MSTR short, 4 May, closed 4 May at $183.68, -$70.8k. Max position notional $2.17m, held 10.55 hours. Flagged as oversized (3.57× median loss). No entry or stop data. Closed on the same day it opened, another micro-scalp that failed.

What the risk simulation reveals

Under a 1% hard stop rule, the account would have realised -$22.4k with a max decline in this window of 0.93%, zero wins. Under 2%, -$44.9k and 1.85% max decline. Under 4%, -$89.8k and 3.7% max decline. The simulation is gross of fees. The actual account lost $836.6k with a 74.97% deepest decline in this window. A mechanical 1% stop would have prevented the SNDK and BRENTOIL catastrophes entirely and reduced total loss by 97.3%. This is not a statement about future performance; it is a historical counterfactual showing that position sizing and loss control were the binding constraint, not edge.

Open positions

Four positions remain open, all short, all without stops:

  • SOL short, 20× leverage, entry $85.15, unrealised -$24.2k. Highly leveraged, no stop.
  • AVAX short, 10× leverage, entry $9.24, unrealised -$43.6k. No stop.
  • HYPE short, 10× leverage, entry $41.26, unrealised -$0.7k. No stop.
  • LIT short, 3× leverage, entry $1.29, unrealised +$718.6k. Only profitable open position; no stop.

The LIT short is the only winner, but it is unhedged. SOL and AVAX are bleeding; HYPE is immaterial. None have stops in place, repeating the pattern from closed trades.

Honest summary

  • Visible strength: Short-side scalps on liquid majors (ETH, BTC) worked when held under 2.5 hours; the account captured $102.4k across five short episodes on these two coins. The edge, if any, is in sub-hour reversals on high-volume instruments.
  • Visible weakness: Position sizing is disconnected from risk. SNDK, BRENTOIL, and MSTR positions were 3.57–18.8× the median loss size. No stops are used. Revenge trading and averaging down on losers are documented behavioural patterns, not one-off mistakes.
  • Visible weakness: The account has no loss-control discipline. The deepest decline in this window of 74.97% occurred over 48 hours. The highest balance in this window was $14.14m; the lowest was $3.54m. This is not volatility; it is uncontrolled deepest decline in this window from two trades.
  • Data scope: Only the most recent 10,000 fills are visible. The account is

Behaviour checksRule-based warnings found in the trading history. They are not moral judgements; they mark patterns worth reviewing.

Rule-based position-cycle checks
FOMO re-entryReopened the same market and direction soon after a winning close, but at a worse entry.
0

No matching position cycles in the data covered.

Averaging downAdded size while the position was already moving against the entry.
1
Examples
  • xyz:BRENTOIL on May 4, 2026: added to the position; while it was already moving against entry; outcome -$5,379.
Oversized loserA losing position cycle more than 3x the wallet's median closed loss.
3
Examples
  • xyz:MSTR: -$70,816 realised loss; 3.6x median closed loss.
  • xyz:BRENTOIL: -$354,172 realised loss; 17.8x median closed loss.
+1 more matching cycle
Revenge tradeOpened a larger-than-normal position within one hour after a closed loss.
4
Examples
  • ETH on May 3, 2026: followed a -$13,982 loss; larger-than-normal size.
  • ETH on May 4, 2026: followed a -$5,379 loss; larger-than-normal size.
+2 more matching cycles
ExpectancyAverage result per closed position cycle after wins and losses are blended. Positive means each completed cycle added money on average.-$46,478.25
Fees / realised PnLFees as a share of realised trading PnL. High values mean execution cost is eating a meaningful part of the edge.n/a
Maker fill rateShare of fills that added liquidity rather than crossed the spread. Higher maker share usually means more patient execution.+41.1%

Expectancy is not a forecast. It is the historical average result per closed position cycle in this reconstructed sample.

Risk simulatorA counterfactual replay of the same historical trades using fixed risk limits. It is for comparing risk shape, not predicting future returns.

Replays the same closed position cycles with 1%, 2%, and 4% account-risk sizing. It shows what the wallet would have made or lost if each eligible cycle was sized from account value at entry and a structural stop.

1% account-risk ruleThis scenario limits each eligible position cycle to about 1% of account value at the simulated stop.-$22,444
Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
-0.9%
Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
0
2% account-risk ruleThis scenario limits each eligible position cycle to about 2% of account value at the simulated stop.-$44,888
Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
-1.9%
Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
0
4% account-risk ruleThis scenario limits each eligible position cycle to about 4% of account value at the simulated stop.-$89,775
Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
-3.7%
Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
0

The 1%, 2%, and 4% rules are account-risk limits per position cycle, not leverage settings. If the simulated stop is breached, the cycle is stopped early. Outputs are gross of fees and funding, so use them as risk-shape comparisons rather than exact alternate realised trading PnL.

No simulator curve yetThis wallet has 1 simulated close with usable stop and candle data. The cards above are scenario totals; a time-series curve needs at least two simulated closes.

Top lossesThe largest realised losing position cycles in the data covered by this audit.

Click a row for the trade breakdown
MarketThe traded Hyperliquid market or coin.SideLong means the wallet benefited if price rose. Short means it benefited if price fell.SizeLargest notional exposure reached during the reconstructed position cycle.PnLRealised profit or loss when the position cycle closed.DateClosed date when available; otherwise the cycle open date.

Top winsThe largest realised winning position cycles in the data covered by this audit.

Realised position-cycle outcomes
MarketThe traded Hyperliquid market or coin.SideLong means the wallet benefited if price rose. Short means it benefited if price fell.SizeLargest notional exposure reached during the reconstructed position cycle.PnLRealised profit or loss when the position cycle closed.DateClosed date when available; otherwise the cycle open date.
ETHshort$9,991,043$59,7752026-05-04
BTCshort$9,992,041$34,6552026-05-04
ETHshort$4,904,596$7,7052026-05-04
xyz:INTCshort$1,514,718$4,9952026-05-04
xyz:TSLAshort$594,959$3,4722026-05-04

By marketBreaks the audit down by traded market or coin so you can see which markets helped or hurt the account.

Realised results by coin
CoinThe traded Hyperliquid market.CyclesClosed reconstructed position cycles for this market. One cycle can contain many fills.WinShare of that market's closed position cycles that ended positive.PnLRealised PnL attributed to this market's closed position cycles in the data covered by this audit.
xyz:SNDK10.0%-$373,415
xyz:BRENTOIL3+33.3%-$358,857
xyz:MSTR10.0%-$70,816
BTC5+40.0%-$60,747
ETH6+33.3%$18,760
xyz:INTC1+100.0%$4,995
xyz:TSLA1+100.0%$3,472
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