- Data used: latest 10,000 public fills from May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026; older public fills may exist outside this audit because the source hit its cap.
- The account is down 25.7% ($836.6k) in the data covered, with a deepest decline in this window of 74.97%.
- The core problem is not edge—short-side ETH and BTC trades generated small wins—but position sizing and loss control.
0x61ceef212ff4a86933c69fb6aca2fe35d8f2a62b
0x61ce...a62b wallet audit
0x61ce...a62b audit. -$836,608 realised trading PnL across 18 closed position cycles, using the latest 10,000 public fills from May 3, 2026 to May 7, 2026; older public fills may exist outside this audit.
The dollar PnL is the realised result from closed trades in the data covered. The percentage uses an inferred starting value (current account value $2,419,679 minus closed trading PnL -$836,608 = starting estimate $3,256,287). This audit does not ingest a deposit or withdrawal ledger, so it can show that trades lost money, but it cannot prove whether the owner also moved funds in or out. Older fills may also exist outside the latest 10,000-fill window.
This is not a fixed last-week or last-month period. It is the actual span covered by the latest 10,000 public fills Hyperliquid exposed for this wallet. Because the public fill source hit its cap, older trades may exist but are not included here.
- Public fills
- 10,000
- Position cycles
- 18 closed, 5 open
- Limit
- latest 10,000 fills only
- Visible strength: Short-side scalps on liquid majors (ETH, BTC) worked when held under 2.5 hours; the account captured $102.4k across five short episodes on these two coins. The edge, if any, is in sub-hour reversals on high-volume instruments.
- Visible weakness: Position sizing is disconnected from risk. SNDK, BRENTOIL, and MSTR positions were 3.57–18.8× the median loss size. No stops are used. Revenge trading and averaging down on losers are documented behavioural patterns, not one-off mistakes.
- Visible weakness: The account has no loss-control discipline. The deepest decline in this window of 74.97% occurred over 48 hours. The highest balance in this window was $14.14m; the lowest was $3.54m. This is not volatility; it is uncontrolled deepest decline in this window from two trades.
- Data scope: Only the most recent 10,000 fills are visible. The account is
Bottom line up front
Only the most recent public fills are visible, so this audit covers the data covered rather than full account history. The account is down 25.7% ($836.6k) in the data covered, with a deepest decline in this window of 74.97%. The core problem is not edge—short-side ETH and BTC trades generated small wins—but position sizing and loss control. Three trades (SNDK short, BRENTOIL long, MSTR short) account for $818k of the loss; all three were oversized relative to median loss size and executed with no stops. Revenge trading and averaging down on losers amplified the damage.
What the data shows
The account opened with $3.26m and reached a highest balance in this window of $14.14m on 4 May, then collapsed to $3.54m by 5 May. The arc is not a slow bleed but a violent spike and crash, driven by two catastrophic single-day trades: SNDK short on 4 May closed in 0.04 hours for -$373.4k (18.8× median loss), and BRENTOIL long opened on 4 May and closed on 7 May for -$354.2k (17.83× median loss). The BRENTOIL position was also flagged as a revenge trade following a $5.4k loss on the same instrument earlier that day.
Across 18 closed episodes, the account realised -$801.6k in PnL and paid $33.6k in fees, for a net loss of -$835.2k. The win rate is 38.89%, but wins average $16.1k while losses average -$86.3k, yielding a profit factor of 0.12 and expectancy of -$46.5k per trade. Long trades lost $358.9k (33.33% win rate); short trades lost $477.8k (40% win rate). Neither direction showed edge.
By instrument, only ETH (6 episodes, +$18.8k) and INTC (1 episode, +$5k) and TSLA (1 episode, +$3.5k) were profitable. SNDK, BRENTOIL, MSTR, and BTC combined for -$863.1k across 10 episodes. The largest wins were two short ETH trades on 3–4 May (+$59.8k and +$7.7k) and a short BTC trade on 3 May (+$34.7k), all under 2.5 hours. These micro-wins were dwarfed by single catastrophic losses.
Trade quality
Win rate of 38.89% with a profit factor of 0.12 means the account won on 7 of 18 closed trades but lost 12× more per loss than it gained per win. The win/loss ratio of 0.19 is severe. Expectancy of -$46.5k per trade is the plainest statement: on average, each closed position lost $46.5k before fees. Gross fees of $33.6k were paid on $183.1m in gross volume (41.15% maker), a reasonable fee rate, but fees are immaterial next to the realised PnL damage.
Post-mortems
SNDK short, 4 May, closed 4 May at $1,250.69, -$373.4k. Opened and closed on the same day in 0.04 hours with a max position notional of $3.59m. Flagged as an oversized loser (18.8× median loss). No entry price or stop data available. This was a scalp that went catastrophically wrong in minutes. The position size relative to account equity at that moment was reckless; the speed of execution suggests panic or FOMO entry.
BRENTOIL long, 4 May 05:52 UTC, closed 7 May at $97.37, -$354.2k. Max position notional $11.32m, held 80.39 hours. Flagged as both an oversized loser (17.83× median loss) and a revenge trade following a -$5.4k loss on BRENTOIL earlier on 4 May at 05:44 UTC. The account averaged down 8 times on this position, adding at $107.49, $107.47, and $107.48, each time doubling down into a falling market. No structural stop was in place. This is textbook revenge trading and loss-chasing: after bleeding $5.4k, the account re-entered the same instrument at 3.57× the median loss size and held it through a 3-day decline.
MSTR short, 4 May, closed 4 May at $183.68, -$70.8k. Max position notional $2.17m, held 10.55 hours. Flagged as oversized (3.57× median loss). No entry or stop data. Closed on the same day it opened, another micro-scalp that failed.
What the risk simulation reveals
Under a 1% hard stop rule, the account would have realised -$22.4k with a max decline in this window of 0.93%, zero wins. Under 2%, -$44.9k and 1.85% max decline. Under 4%, -$89.8k and 3.7% max decline. The simulation is gross of fees. The actual account lost $836.6k with a 74.97% deepest decline in this window. A mechanical 1% stop would have prevented the SNDK and BRENTOIL catastrophes entirely and reduced total loss by 97.3%. This is not a statement about future performance; it is a historical counterfactual showing that position sizing and loss control were the binding constraint, not edge.
Open positions
Four positions remain open, all short, all without stops:
- SOL short, 20× leverage, entry $85.15, unrealised -$24.2k. Highly leveraged, no stop.
- AVAX short, 10× leverage, entry $9.24, unrealised -$43.6k. No stop.
- HYPE short, 10× leverage, entry $41.26, unrealised -$0.7k. No stop.
- LIT short, 3× leverage, entry $1.29, unrealised +$718.6k. Only profitable open position; no stop.
The LIT short is the only winner, but it is unhedged. SOL and AVAX are bleeding; HYPE is immaterial. None have stops in place, repeating the pattern from closed trades.
Honest summary
- Visible strength: Short-side scalps on liquid majors (ETH, BTC) worked when held under 2.5 hours; the account captured $102.4k across five short episodes on these two coins. The edge, if any, is in sub-hour reversals on high-volume instruments.
- Visible weakness: Position sizing is disconnected from risk. SNDK, BRENTOIL, and MSTR positions were 3.57–18.8× the median loss size. No stops are used. Revenge trading and averaging down on losers are documented behavioural patterns, not one-off mistakes.
- Visible weakness: The account has no loss-control discipline. The deepest decline in this window of 74.97% occurred over 48 hours. The highest balance in this window was $14.14m; the lowest was $3.54m. This is not volatility; it is uncontrolled deepest decline in this window from two trades.
- Data scope: Only the most recent 10,000 fills are visible. The account is
Behaviour checksRule-based warnings found in the trading history. They are not moral judgements; they mark patterns worth reviewing.
Rule-based position-cycle checksNo matching position cycles in the data covered.
- xyz:BRENTOIL on May 4, 2026: added to the position; while it was already moving against entry; outcome -$5,379.
- xyz:MSTR: -$70,816 realised loss; 3.6x median closed loss.
- xyz:BRENTOIL: -$354,172 realised loss; 17.8x median closed loss.
- ETH on May 3, 2026: followed a -$13,982 loss; larger-than-normal size.
- ETH on May 4, 2026: followed a -$5,379 loss; larger-than-normal size.
Expectancy is not a forecast. It is the historical average result per closed position cycle in this reconstructed sample.
Risk simulatorA counterfactual replay of the same historical trades using fixed risk limits. It is for comparing risk shape, not predicting future returns.
Replays the same closed position cycles with 1%, 2%, and 4% account-risk sizing. It shows what the wallet would have made or lost if each eligible cycle was sized from account value at entry and a structural stop.
- Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
- -0.9%
- Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
- 0
- Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
- -1.9%
- Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
- 0
- Max drawdownLargest high-to-low account-value drop inside this simulated replay.
- -3.7%
- Stopped earlyHow many historical position cycles would have exited before the real close because the simulated stop was hit.
- 0
The 1%, 2%, and 4% rules are account-risk limits per position cycle, not leverage settings. If the simulated stop is breached, the cycle is stopped early. Outputs are gross of fees and funding, so use them as risk-shape comparisons rather than exact alternate realised trading PnL.