0x8e80c4b533dd977cf716b5c24fd9223129272804
0x8e80...2804 audit. $1,932 realised trading PnL across 228 closed position cycles, using the latest 10,000 public fills from Apr 30, 2026 to May 20, 2026; older public fills may exist outside this audit.
The dollar PnL is the realised result from closed trades in the data covered. The percentage uses an inferred starting value (current account value $154,493 minus closed trading PnL $1,932 = starting estimate $152,560). This audit does not ingest a deposit or withdrawal ledger, so it can show that trades lost money, but it cannot prove whether the owner also moved funds in or out. Older fills may also exist outside the latest 10,000-fill window.
This is not a fixed last-week or last-month period. It is the actual span covered by the latest 10,000 public fills Hyperliquid exposed for this wallet. Because the public fill source hit its cap, older trades may exist but are not included here.
Only the most recent public fills are visible, so this audit covers the data covered rather than full account history. The account is near break-even in that window: +1.27% realised PnL ($1,932 on a $152.6k starting balance) after $2,720 in fees. The headline obscures severe behavioural leakage. The account posted a highest balance in this window of $189.3k on 6 May, then suffered a deepest decline in this window of 23.07% to $145.6k by 12 May—a swing driven almost entirely by oversized revenge trades and FOMO re-entries into losing positions. The core problem is not edge; it is position sizing and emotional recovery trading that has consumed the profit from a genuinely profitable core strategy.
This account opened on 30 April and closed 228 trades over 19 days. The account is profitable on paper—$4,437.54 in realised PnL before fees—but fees ($2,720) consumed 61.3% of gross profit, leaving $1,932 net. That margin is thin enough that a single oversized loser or a string of revenge trades can erase it entirely, which is exactly what happened between 6 May and 12 May.
The account has genuine edge in three instruments: hyna:ETH (23 episodes, +$2,395.89 realised), hyna:SOL (30 episodes, +$1,680.05 realised), and ETH (36 episodes, +$1,501.94 realised). These three account for $5,577.88 in realised profit. The account has no edge in SOL (81 episodes, -$3,545.80 realised), BTC (35 episodes, -$48.52 realised), and hyna:BTC (23 episodes, -$51.11 realised). SOL alone has destroyed $3,545.80—more than the total profit from the three winning instruments combined.
Long trades generated $1,202.42 (55.65% win rate), while shorts generated $730.03 (59.29% win rate). The account is slightly more consistent on the short side but makes more money on longs. The issue is not directional; it is instrument selection and position management.
The behavioural flags reveal the mechanism of decay. The account averaged down on five separate positions (ETH short, hyna:SOL short, BTC long, SOL long, SOL short). It re-entered ETH five times after closing positions, each time at higher prices and with diminishing profit ($106.96, $48.67, $0.42, $0.47, $41.85). It opened five revenge trades immediately after losses, including a $60.5k notional BTC long after a $212.60 loss in hyna:SOL. The two largest losses in the data covered—hyna:BTC short on 4-5 May (-$1,464.24) and SOL short on 6 May (-$1,237.25)—were both oversized positions (70k and 72k notional respectively) that violated structural stop distances of 1.07% and 0.97%.
Win rate is 57.46% across 228 closed episodes. Profit factor is 1.12—barely above breakeven before fees. Expectancy is $8.48 per trade, which is noise-level given average loss of -$166.28 and average win of $137.88. Win/loss ratio is 0.83, meaning the account wins more often but loses more per loss than it wins per win.
These numbers describe an account with marginal edge that is being eroded by execution. The 57% win rate is respectable. The 1.12 profit factor is fragile. The $8.48 expectancy is illusory once fees are factored in—the account is essentially break-even on a per-trade basis after costs.
hyna:ETH long, 11-15 May, entry 2325.1, exit 2279.85, -$1,189.92 loss. This trade carried three red flags: FOMO re-entry (the account had closed an ETH position on 2 May at 2297.40 and re-entered on 3 May at 2309.50), oversized position ($50.4k notional), and revenge trade (opened after a hyna:SOL loss). The position was held 95.94 hours, moved against the account immediately (MAE -3.74%), and never recovered (MFE only +0.68%). The structural stop distance was 0.77%, but the account allowed a 3.74% adverse move. This is the clearest example of a trade that should not have been sized or held.
ETH long, 6-7 May, entry 2347.5, exit 2326.21, -$1,064.47 loss. Opened on 6 May at the highest balance in this window, this trade was flagged as averaging down, oversized ($76.3k notional), and a revenge trade (opened after a hyna:SOL short loss). Held only 22 hours, the position moved against the account immediately (MAE -0.48%), closed with minimal recovery (MFE +0.37%), and crystallised a loss. The structural stop was 1.24% away; the account allowed a 0.48% move to become a full loss. This trade occurred during the highest-to-lowest balance move in this window collapse and exemplifies the pattern: after a loss, the account sized up into a different instrument and held through adverse price action.
Under a 1% stop rule applied historically, the account would have realised $21,637.70 with a maximum decline of 9.78%. Under 2%, it would have realised $43,275.41 with a maximum decline of 17.5%. Under 4%, it would have realised $86,550.82 with a maximum decline of 28.93%. The simulator stopped 33 episodes early across all three scenarios (gross of fees).
These counterfactuals are stark. A mechanical 1% stop would have turned a near-breakeven account into a +$21.6k winner and cut the deepest decline in this window from 23.07% to 9.78%. The account's actual behaviour—holding through 3-4% adverse moves, averaging down, and revenge trading—has cost it roughly $20k in simulated profit relative to a simple rule. The simulator shows that the account's edge exists, but its execution destroys it.
One open position: SOL short, 84.4593 entry, 10x leverage, $19.33 unrealised profit. No stop in place. This position is still open and the outcome is unknown until it is closed. The account is currently profitable on this trade, but the absence of a stop order leaves it exposed to the same pattern that has defined the data covered: holding through adverse moves and averaging down when underwater.
Expectancy is not a forecast. It is the historical average result per closed position cycle in this reconstructed sample.
Replays the same closed position cycles with 1%, 2%, and 4% account-risk sizing. It shows what the wallet would have made or lost if each eligible cycle was sized from account value at entry and a structural stop.
The 1%, 2%, and 4% rules are account-risk limits per position cycle, not leverage settings. If the simulated stop is breached, the cycle is stopped early. Outputs are gross of fees and funding, so use them as risk-shape comparisons rather than exact alternate realised trading PnL.