0x940df59ba33f3387deff3c2400fecf1286fcce4c
0x940d...ce4c audit. -$5,394,105 realised trading PnL across 37 closed position cycles, using 2,000 public fills from Apr 6, 2025 to May 6, 2025.
The dollar PnL is the realised result from closed trades in the data covered. The percentage uses an inferred starting value (current account value $333 minus closed trading PnL -$5,394,105 = starting estimate $5,394,438). This audit does not ingest a deposit or withdrawal ledger, so it can show that trades lost money, but it cannot prove whether the owner also moved funds in or out.
This is not a fixed last-week or last-month period. It is the actual span covered by the public fills used for this wallet, so the page should be read as 29 calendar days of visible trading history.
This account is -99.99% in the analysed window, having lost $5.39M on $5.39M starting capital. The account blew up in a single day: 6 April 2025. Two catastrophic ETH long positions—one entered at 1671.36 and closed at 1602.35 for -$3.82M, the second at 1585.31 closed at 1579.77 for -$1.46M—were opened and closed within hours of each other, followed immediately by revenge trades into BTC and a second ETH position. The account never recovered. Win rate is 62%, but average loss ($386k) dwarfs average win ($600), yielding a profit factor of 0.0 and expectancy of -$145.8k per trade. This is not a trading problem; it is a risk management failure.
The account was active for 29 days from 6 April to 6 May 2025, executing 37 closed trades and 1 open position. Starting capital was approximately $5.39M. The entire loss occurred on 6 April in a two-hour window. At 18:11 UTC on 6 April, the account opened an ETH long at 1671.36 with a notional of $25.1M—a 4.7x leverage position on a $5.39M account. This position moved against the trader immediately and was closed at 1602.35 after 2.38 hours for -$3.82M. Fourteen minutes later, at 20:34 UTC, a second ETH long was opened at 1585.31 with notional $9.34M, closed at 1579.77 after 41 minutes for -$1.46M. At 21:15 UTC, a BTC long was opened at 79349.18 with notional $4.96M, held for 9.33 hours, and closed at 77799.85 for -$116k. By 21:16 UTC, a third position—ETH long at 1471.57, notional $966k—was opened and closed at 1587.11 after 16.26 hours for +$1.88M, the account's largest single win.
After 6 April, the account had $957.73 remaining (the trough). Over the next 17 days, the trader executed 33 additional trades, winning 23 of them (69.7% win rate on the post-blowup sample). The account recovered to $2,066.76 by 23 April (the peak in this window), a 116% gain from trough. However, the wins were small—median win around $1.2k—while the account remained exposed to outsized losses. ETH accounted for 30 closed episodes with -$5.28M realised PnL; BTC contributed 4 episodes with -$115.6k; SOL 3 episodes with -$20.19. Long positions lost $5.40M; short positions gained $2.92k. The account's only profitable side was shorts, but the short book was negligible in volume.
Fees paid were $11,039.44 on $47M gross volume, a 23 basis-point drag. The fee burden is immaterial relative to the PnL catastrophe. The real issue is position sizing and leverage: the first two positions alone represented 150% of account equity, opened within minutes of each other into the same instrument, and both closed at losses. This pattern—oversized entries, rapid reversals, revenge trades—repeats across the 6 April sequence and is flagged in the behavioural data.
Win rate is 62.16% across 37 closed trades. Profit factor is 0.0 (total wins divided by total losses). Average win is $599.95; average loss is -$386,278.84. Expectancy is -$145,786.62 per trade. The win/loss ratio is 0.0 because the four largest losses ($3.82M, $1.46M, $116k, $3.6k) consume all gains from the 23 winning trades. A 62% win rate is superficially respectable, but it is noise: the account is a loss-making machine because the sizing and conviction on losers far exceeds sizing on winners. The longest win streak was 9 trades; the longest loss streak was 3. The asymmetry is stark: the account risked $25M to win $600.
ETH long, 6 April 18:11–20:49 UTC, 1671.36 → 1602.35, -$3,819,645.05
Opened with $25.1M notional on a $5.39M account. Closed after 2.38 hours. This is the single largest loss in the dataset and is flagged as an oversized loser. The structural stop was 3% away (instrument default), implying a liquidation boundary around 1621.50. The position moved 4.1% against entry within the hold window and was closed at a loss. No evidence of a hard stop being hit; the close appears discretionary. This trade alone consumed 71% of account equity.
ETH long, 6 April 20:34–21:03 UTC, 1585.31 → 1579.77, -$1,461,650.23
Opened 14 minutes after the previous ETH long closed. Notional $9.34M on remaining equity of ~$1.53M. Flagged as both a revenge trade (previous loss was the $3.82M ETH position) and an oversized loser. Closed after 41 minutes for -$1.46M. This position was opened in direct response to the prior loss and sized larger than the account could absorb. The structural stop at 3% would have been around 1537.55; the close at 1579.77 suggests the trader exited before a hard stop.
BTC long, 6 April 21:15 – 7 April 06:48 UTC, 79349.18 → 77799.85, -$116,101.74
Opened immediately after the second ETH loss closed. Notional $4.96M. Flagged as a revenge trade (previous loss was the $1.46M ETH position), an oversized loser, and an averaging-down episode (13 add events, max size 62.38 contracts). The position was held for 9.33 hours and averaged down 13 times, suggesting the trader was fighting the move rather than accepting the loss. Closed at a 1.95% loss from entry. This is the third consecutive loss, all within 90 minutes of each other, all on oversized positions.
Under a 1% hard stop rule, the account would have realised -$16,604.20 with a max drawdown of -1.3%, win rate 54.05%. Under a 2% rule, -$33,208.40 and -2.61% max drawdown. Under a 4% rule, -$66,416.81 and -5.21% max drawdown. These are gross-of-fees figures. The simulator stopped 7 episodes early across all three rules, indicating that hard stops would have prevented some of the largest losses. The actual max drawdown was -32.66%, more than 6x worse than the 4% rule scenario. A disciplined 1% stop would have reduced losses by 99.7% relative to actual outcome.
No open positions at the time of this audit.
Expectancy is not a forecast. It is the historical average result per closed position cycle in this reconstructed sample.
Replays the same closed position cycles with 1%, 2%, and 4% account-risk sizing. It shows what the wallet would have made or lost if each eligible cycle was sized from account value at entry and a structural stop.
The 1%, 2%, and 4% rules are account-risk limits per position cycle, not leverage settings. If the simulated stop is breached, the cycle is stopped early. Outputs are gross of fees and funding, so use them as risk-shape comparisons rather than exact alternate realised trading PnL.