Bottom line up front
This account is -92.23% in the data covered, having collapsed from a highest balance in this window balance of $25,125.90 to a lowest balance in this window of $125.96—a deepest decline in this window of 99.5%. Only the most recent public fills are visible, so this audit covers the data covered rather than full account history. The core pattern is uncontrolled position sizing on a losing edge: 1,879 closed trades across BTC and SILVER with a 31% win rate, 0.62 profit factor, and negative expectancy of -$0.80 per trade. Revenge trading and oversized losers dominate the behavioural signature. The account is still bleeding capital despite a small long BTC position currently held at 52.9% unrealised ROE.
What the data shows
The account opened with approximately $1,631 and ran 1,879 closed episodes across two main instruments: SILVER (689 episodes, -$1,385 realised PnL) and BTC (1,184 episodes, -$119 realised PnL). The account reached $25,125.90 on 25 February 2026, then entered a catastrophic deepest decline in this window phase that erased 99.5% of that highest balance in this window within nine days. The current balance sits at $126.66.
SILVER is the primary damage vector. Short positions lost $1,211.73 and long positions lost $173.32, for a combined -$1,385.05 realised loss across 689 trades. BTC fared marginally better but still negative: shorts lost $27.51, longs lost $91.65, totalling -$119.17 across 1,184 trades. The asymmetry is stark: the account has no profitable side on either instrument. Long positions across both coins show a 31.64% win rate; shorts show 30.41%. Neither direction works.
Fees consumed $336.61 in gross costs, paid almost entirely as maker rebates (99.7% maker fill rate), so the fee structure is not the primary culprit. The realised loss of -$1,167.69 after fees is the true damage. Gross closed trade volume reached $10.17 million, indicating extreme leverage and turnover relative to the $1,631 starting capital.
Trade quality
Win rate of 31.03% with a profit factor of 0.62 means the account wins on roughly one trade in three, but losses are substantially larger than wins. Average win: $4.25. Average loss: -$3.07. Win-to-loss ratio of 1.38 is inverted—the account closes winners too early and lets losers run. Expectancy of -$0.80 per trade is the mechanical outcome: over 1,879 trades, that compounds to the observed loss.
The max win streak reached 9 trades; the max loss streak reached 20. A 20-trade losing streak on a 31% win-rate system is not an outlier—it is the expected behaviour of a system with no edge. The account has no edge on BTC, no edge on SILVER, and no edge directionally.
Post-mortems
The two largest recent losses both occurred on 6 February 2026 in SILVER and are flagged as oversized losers and revenge trades.
Trade 1: SILVER short, 6 February 2026, 1.39 hours. Entered at 74.60, exited at 75.77, loss of -$192.74 on a $18,457.53 notional position. The structural stop distance was 5.0% (ATR 14 1H), meaning the account risked $923 to make an unknown amount. This was a revenge trade following a prior loss. The position was closed at a loss within 84 minutes.
Trade 2: SILVER short, 6 February 2026, 0.34 hours. Entered at 77.75, exited at 78.14, loss of -$179.95 on a $35,999.42 notional position. Structural stop was 2.55% away. This was also flagged as a revenge trade and oversized loser. The account re-entered SILVER shorts immediately after the first loss, doubling down into a market moving against it, and lost again within 20 minutes.
Both trades exemplify the pattern: after a loss, the account sizes up, re-enters the same direction, and suffers larger losses. The structural stops were tight relative to the notional exposure, but the account did not respect them—it closed at market instead.
What the risk simulation reveals
Under a 1% hard stop rule applied historically, the account would have realised -$132.37 PnL with a deepest decline in this window of -9.03%, stopping early on 6 episodes. Under a 2% rule, -$264.74 and -18.04%. Under a 4% rule, -$529.48 and -36.0%. Even with mechanical stops in place, the account would have lost money—but the losses would have been contained. The actual loss of -$1,504.30 is 2.8x worse than the 4% rule scenario, demonstrating that position sizing and lack of stops are the primary failure modes, not market direction.
Open positions
One open position: BTC long, 0.0013 size, entry price $63,292, mark price $64,129, held for 28 days on 40x cross margin. Unrealised PnL is +$1.07 (52.9% unrealised ROE). No stop is in place. Liquidation price is not provided, but on 40x cross margin with $2.05 margin used and $82.09 position value, the account has minimal buffer. This position is still open; the outcome is unknown until closed.
Honest summary
- Visible strength: Maker rebate structure (99.7% maker fills) and tight execution on individual fills. The account is not losing to slippage; it is losing to a system with no edge.
- Visible weakness: Catastrophic position sizing discipline. The five largest losses are 3.3x to 4.3x the median loss size. Revenge trading and averaging down are endemic. The account re-enters losing positions within minutes and sizes up into them. Win rate of 31% with average losses larger than average wins guarantees compounding losses.
- Visible weakness: No stops. The structural stop distances are calculated but not enforced. The account closes at market, often at the worst time, after the move has already hurt it.
- Data scope caveat: Only the most recent 10,000 fills are visible. Earlier account history is not available. The highest balance in this window balance of $25,125.90 and the subsequent collapse to $125.96 occurred within the data covered, but the initial capital accumulation phase is not visible. The current $1.07 unrealised gain on BTC is immaterial relative to the $1,504 realised loss.